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Abstract
This article explores the merits of a new criterion for default rules in
incomplete contracts: fill the gaps with terms that are favorable to the
party with the greater bargaining power. It argues that some of the more
common gaps in contracts involve purely distributive issues, such as the
contract price, for which it is impossible to choose a unique, jointmaximizing, “most efficient” term. Rather, the term that mimics the
hypothetical bargain in these settings must be sensitive to the bargaining
power of the parties—the term they would have chosen to divide the
surplus in light of their relative bargaining strength. The article explores
the justifications for such a bargain-mimicking principle, the ways it can
be implemented by courts, and the subtle ways it is already in place.
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GAP FILLING AND BARGAINING POWER

INTRODUCTION
How to fill gaps in incomplete agreements is perhaps the most important
question in contract law. It is important because interpreting and
supplementing contracts is what courts often do, but also because the
default rules set by law determine how contracts will be written.
Providing a coherent answer to this question of how to fill gaps is also
where the economic approach to contracts had its greatest success.
The most broadly accepted principle of gap filling is ‘mimic the parties
will.’ Only gap-fillers that mimic what the parties themselves would
have chosen would be allowed by the parties to remain in place and
survive opt-out; and they will reduce the unnecessary costs of drafting.1
Of course, the notion of the parties’ will is hypothetical. Because the
contract contains a gap, we don’t know what they would have consented
to. It is here that the economic approach provides another, very powerful,
insight: the parties’ will is to have the most efficient arrangement. Thus
they are best served by default rules that maximize the contractual
surplus.2
The idea that gap-fillers should be the surplus maximizing terms is based
on the following well-known logic. If the parties are rational—so goes
the argument—they would have agreed upon terms that maximize their
joint surplus, irrespective of the distributive impact of such terms.
Further, they would have corrected for the distributive effects of the
surplus maximizing terms by an appropriate adjustment of the
1

Richard Craswell, Contract Law: General Theories in III ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1, 3-4 (2000).
2
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98 (6th ed. 2003)
(“[C]ontract law cannot readily be used to achieve goals other than efficiency. A ruling
that fails to interpolate the efficient term will not affect future conduct; it will be
reversed by the parties in their subsequent dealings. It will only impose additional—and
avoidable—transaction costs.”). See also FRANK EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 17-22 (1991); Alan Schwartz and
Robert Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L. J. 541,
554-5 (2004); FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 486 (4th Ed. 2004) (courts are to provide
terms “that an economist would describe as maximizing the expected value of the
transaction”); Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 Colum. L.Rev
997, 1064-72 (1992) (the default rule should be a joint maximization rule.)
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contractual price or of another purely distributive term. But notice that
for this theory to be valid, it must assume that there is at least one term in
the contract to which the theory does not apply—the term that the parties
use to make the appropriate distributive adjustments—usually, the price
term. The content of the purely distributive terms is not determined by
the surplus maximizing criterion; it is surplus-neutral. Rather, the content
of the purely distributive term is determined by the bargaining power of
the parties. In other words, the surplus maximizing conception of gapfilling is, by definition, insufficient to resolve all gaps: it does not resolve
gaps in the price term or in any other term in the contract that is purely
distributive.
Thus, there is a troubling paradox surrounding the basic criterion of gap
filling. It assumes that the parties’ joint will exists—that there is a single
term such that, if only the parties spent the time and attention dealing
with the gap, they would have jointly desired the surplus-maximizing
term. Yet the existence of a gap in a contract is often an indication that a
consensus could be reached—that a single jointly preferable term does
not exist. That is, the gap in the contract is often surrounding a purely
distributive issue—the one over which the parties interests diverge.
Ironically, many of the cases in contracts casebooks that introduce the
topic of indefiniteness and gap-filling involve purely distributive gaps
over issues such as price, for which the prescription “choose the terms
that maximize the total surplus” does not provide a definite solution.
For example, in Oglebay Norton v. Armco, two large companies had a
long-term relational contract for transportation of iron ore.3 The term that
ended up in the center of a bitter dispute was none other than the price.
Their agreement originally had a price formula, but over time this
formula failed and needed to be revised. When the parties turned to the
court to help fill the price gap, there was no single term that reflected
“market price” which the court could invoke (indeed, if there were such
price, they would not need the court to supply it). Of course, there was
no “surplus maximizing” price to fill the gap because the price is
surplus-neutral. The court had to supply a “reasonable” gap-filler that is
3

Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 515 (S.Ct. Ohio, 1990), reprinted in
IAN AYRES AND RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW (7th Ed. 2008).
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purely distributive. It ended up doing so in part by splitting the
difference and in part in a creative and unorthodox manner (forcing the
CEOs of the companies to meet and mediate the future price). And yet,
the difficulty that the court encountered and the ad-hoc solution it found
merely emphasize the absence of a systematic solution—the absence of
rational criterion for filling such gaps. The purpose of this paper is to
begin developing a systematic new gap-filling criterion for these
distributive price gaps.
The proposed criterion, which I label the “bargain mimicking” gap filler,
is consistent with the fundamental norm of mimic-the-the-parties’-will.
In the case of purely distributive terms there is no joint will: each party’s
will is to have a term at the more favorable end of the reasonable range
of terms. What we need, then, is more information about the way the
parties would have resolved the a-priori conflict of their wills. Namely,
what the court needs is information to mimic the bargain: the division of
the surplus that would have been struck between these parties, given the
allocation of bargaining power. Since this division of bargaining power
can be uneven, the gap filler can be different than the mid-range
“market” term. It would favor the strong party—the one whose will
would have more likely prevailed if an explicit bargain were to be struck.
Purely distributive gaps would be filled with terms favorable to the party
with the greater bargaining power.
It might seem, at first blush, that this criterion is counter-intuitive and
ought to be rejected as unfair. I will defend its more subtle appeal in this
paper, but the core claim is perhaps more intuitive than initially seems,
and can be illuminated with an example from a non-legal setting. Take,
for example, an incomplete command issued by a parent to a child
(“mow the lawn”). If imperfectly specified, it needs supplementation
(“only the front yard” v. “both front yard and back yard”), and more than
one reasonable version can be offered. Still, if it is the parent that has the
“bargaining power”—the power to dictate the command—then the
precise term that ought to apply is the one that is consistent with the
meaning intended by this stronger party. The parent can reasonably say
to the child: “You knew or should have known what I meant,” implying
that the parent’s will, by virtue of being dominant, is the controlling
source of interpretation. In fact, such interpretive method would render it
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unnecessary for the parent to explicitly state the meaning, and there are
benefits to using minimal language. To be sure, in this example I am not
talking about a legal gap filler but rather about an informal norm that
governs the intra-family commuincations, but their function is the
same—to supply a default content to an otherwise ambiguous provision,
and they do so in a way that mimics the will of the party with the power
to dictate.
It is not always clear that courts can figure out, ex post, how bargaining
power was divided before the contract was concluded. The parent/child
example is (in most cases) misleadingly easy, whereas the notion of
bargaining strength in commercial relations is more elusive. The paper
explores what it is exactly that courts would need to determine and
whether they have the institutional capacity to do so. It will also argue
that in a subtle way courts, when filling price gaps, are already sensitive
to the division of bargaining power. For example, when courts need to
determine what is a “reasonable” price under §2-305(1) of the Uniform
Commercial Code, they can choose to let one party have more influence
in choosing where, within a broad range, this price would lie. This is
often done when courts observe that the choosing party is the one with
the greater bargaining power.4
Part I of this paper introduces the idea of bargain mimicking gap fillers.
It explores the conceptual basis for this idea, how it relates to other
criteria of gap filling, and when it may be regarded as the natural
substitute for the otherwise compelling, but indeterminate principle of
maximize-the-joint-surplus. Part II explores the normative grounding for
this regime. It is not an easy task. Admittedly, there is something
objectionable about a legal rule that favors the strong party, the party
with the greater bargaining power. Bargaining power is hardly a
compelling conception of distributive fairness. Legal rules that favor the
weak party, that level the playing field, are usually more appealing. But
in the law of gap filling, I argue in Part II, bargaining power trumps this
normative predisposition. Default rules that try to upset the potential
bargaining outcome are undesirable—they are a futile effort—and I
4

See, e.g., Curtis Co. v. Mathews, 653 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Id. 1982), reprinted in ROBERT
E. SCOTT AND JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY (4th Ed. 2007) (a
middleman was allowed to set the price of grain bought from farmer).
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provide examples from actual drafting of contracts to highlight this
point. The analysis shows that the traditional justifications for default
rules—saving of transactions costs, facilitating entry into desirable forms
of relationship, and inducing optimal reliance—carry over to the bargainmimicking conception of gap filling.
Part III of the paper identifies the existence of bargain-mimicking gapfillers in contract law. It demonstrates how this idea was implemented in
leading cases, although without courts always recognizing the fact that
their decisions conform to the underlying bargain-mimicking conception.
The purpose of this inquiry is to elevate the bargain-mimicking theory to
a positive account. Courts actually do this, I argue, suggesting that it is
not institutionally impossible to base a legal rule on a criterion as elusive
as relative bargaining power. This section also highlights situations in
which the bargain-mimicking idea was rejected, thus recognizing that the
bargain mimicking idea conflicts with other, well-rooted principles.
Finally, Part IV offers one extension of the analysis by introducing the
problem posed by excessive terms—terms that go beyond some
mandatory threshold of permissible contracting. When such excessive
terms are struck down and need to be replaced, courts may view the
problem as one of gap-filling. Here, it is generally clear that one party
holds greater bargaining power (which he used to dictate the excessive
term). A bargain-mimicking term would maintain maximal loyalty to the
bargain struck between the parties. It would fill the gap with a term that
is maximally tolerable: a term that is still one-sided, still favorable to the
same party who dictated the original one-sided term, but moderated
sufficiently so that it would be tolerable. Instead of substituting the
offensive term with the most balanced “majoritarian” term, the court
would reduce it only so much as to fit it within the range that is
considered legitimate. The court would mimic the hypothetical bargain
that parties negotiating over a truncated domain would reach. I argue
(and develop this argument further in a companion paper) that this idea
of using maximally tolerable terms is surprisingly prevalent in the law.5

5

See Omri Ben-Shahar, How to Repair Unconscionable Contracts (Mimeo. 2008).
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I. BARGAIN-MIMICKING TERMS
A. No Joint Will
There is a troubling paradox surrounding one of the most basic tenets of
contract law, that gaps in contracts should be filled with term that mimic
the will of the parties—terms that most parties would have jointly
chosen. On the one hand, this conception of gap-filling makes basic
sense: it minimizes the need of the parties to contract around the default
rule and it spells out performance provisions that maximize the parties’
joint well being. But on the other hand, the mimic-the-parties’-will
principle assumes that the parties’ joint will exists. It assumes that there
is a single term such that, if only the parties spent the time and attention
dealing with the gap, they would have jointly supported the drafting of
this term. Yet the existence of a gap in a contract is often an indication
that a consensus could be reached—that a single jointly preferable term
does not exist. The claim from which the analysis in this paper begins is
that there are situations in which more than one term satisfies the
standard conception of the joint will of the parties. If so, absent a more
powerful prescription, the mimicking principle would be indeterminate,
too amorphous to fill the gap.
The problem with the joint will principle of gap-filling, and the reason it
is indeterminate, comes from the fact that the conception of joint will
that is normally articulated is one of maximization of surplus. If the
parties didn’t specify explicitly what they want, it is safe to assume that
they would have wanted the terms that maximize their joint surplus.6 Or
else, it is sometimes said, they would have left “money on the table.”
This, irrespective of the distributive impact of such terms, because the
parties are able to (and probably did) correct for the distributive effects
6

This intuitive proposition was developed in the early work of Goetz and Scott. See,
e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the
Default Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84, 94 n.4 (2003) (“[C]hoosing a default rule on the
basis of some normative conception of fairness would be wrong, in the sense that it
would not increase the amount of fair contracts in the world, but it would increase the
amount of contracting costs.”).
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of the surplus maximizing terms by an appropriate adjustment of the
contractual price or of another purely distributive term.7 But notice that
for this theory to be valid, it must assume that there is at least one term in
the contract to which the theory does not apply, one term that is purely
distributive—the price term. The existence of such term is necessary for
the surplus-maximization criterion: it guarantees that gap-filling
according to this criterion will not undermine the distributive
consequences of the deal.
Put differently, contract design involves two tasks: creating the pie, and
dividing it (many terms affect both aspects). In creating the pie, surplus
maximization is normally the dominant norm. Once the pie is created,
through the combination of express terms and surplus maximizing gapfillers, it has to be divided and the term that accomplishes this aspect has
no bearing on the size of the pie. If one of the distributive terms is
missing from the agreement, the surplus maximizing conception of gapfilling would, by definition, be indeterminate in supplementing it. So
what do we do if the gap involves one of these distributive aspects?
The basic reason to doubt whether there is one joint will that can
potentially be mimicked when the gap involves a distributive issue is that
the parties have opposite interests in resolving this issue. In these
settings, it is impossible to articulate solely on the basis of economic
efficiency what term the parties would have chosen. The process of
reaching agreement over distributive elements is resolved by bargaining,
and is thus determined by ad-hoc factors that affect the parties’
bargaining power and how this power was applied with respect to other
elements of the deal. Filling distributive gaps, then, is not an exercise in
maximization of surplus or in figuring out the optimal design of the
transaction, but in guessing out how the surplus would have been
divided.
Consider for example, a sale contract that does not specify payment
terms. There are many ways to supplement this gap but it can hardly be
7

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 96-97 (7th ed. 2007)
(“Each party wants to maximize his gain from the transaction, and that is usually best
done by agreeing to terms that maximize the surplus created by the transaction – the
excess of benefits over costs, the excess being divided between the parties.”)
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said that they affect the “size of the pie.” In many cases, whether
payment is made before, during, or after delivery, is merely a matter of
the time value of money and would affect the well-being of the parties in
a zero-sum fashion. There is no more or no less efficient arrangement;
the only effect is distributive. There is no joint will to mimic: earlier
payment is usually preferable to the seller to the same extent that it is
detrimental to the buyer. The seller has one will, the buyer has another.
How could it be, you might wonder, that parties entered a binding
contract without specifying the surplus division, leaving the price term
out? Is this scenario realistic? Ironically, some of the most prominent
cases on contractual indefiniteness are ones in which the gaps in the
agreement involved price terms—the one term that by definition has
purely distributive effect. For example, one leading case discusses a
lease of commercial property with an option to renew that contains a
gap—the renewal price is missing (needs “to be agreed upon”).8 Another
classic case, Sun Printing v. Remington Paper, involves a sale contract
that contains an indefinite price formula.9 Yet another well-known case
deals with a contract in which the price was deliberately left out and yet
the court was more than ready to supplement it.10 Another casebook
teaches gap-filling through a case is in which the payment and credit
terms—elements that are purely distributive—are not fully specified.11
Further, Sales Law casebooks normally devote a substantial chapter to
the case law regarding commercial contracts (usually between
sophisticated parties) with a missing price—a scenario fully anticipated
by Section 2-308 of the Uniform Commercial Code.12
8

Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E. 2d 541 (N.Y., 1981). In
that case, the court refused to fill the gap and held that the contract was too indefinite to
be enforced. But the growing trend is to enforce such contracts. See, e.g., Validity and
Enforceability of Provision for Renewal of Lease at Rental to Be Fixed By Subsequent
Agreement of the Parties, 58 A.L.R.3d 500 (1974)
9
Sun Printing & Publishing Assn. v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470 (NY
1923) (reprinted in BARNETT, CONTRACTS CASES AND DOCTRINE 404 (3d Ed. 2003).)
10
Mantell v. International Plastic Harmonica Corp., 55 A.2d 250 (NJ 1947) (quoted in
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 209-210 (4th Ed. 2004).)
11
Southwest Engineering Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 473 P.2d 18 (Kan. 1970)
(reprinted in SUMMERS AND HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION 735 (4th
Ed. 2001).)
12
Cite
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There might be—in fact, there is—a debate whether such distributive
gaps render the contracts too indefinite to be enforced. The missing
price, it can be argued, is a conclusive indication that the parties have not
yet intended to be bound, having left the most essential term for further
assent. And yet, modern contract law tends to conclude that a missing
price does not render the contract unenforceable, if there is independent
indication of intent to be bound.13 In these situations, there is a binding
contract with a substantial gap and the gap-filler cannot be determined
by reference to the term (the price) that maximizes the total surplus.
Every price, at least within a fairly broad interval, satisfies this criterion.
True, many aspects of the contract that are primarily distributive also
have effect on total surplus. But it is false to conclude that gap fillers for
all these aspects can be set to maximize the surplus. As I mentioned at
the outset, the only reason that a sub-set of the gap fillers can
indisputably be surplus-maximizing is that there are other aspects of the
deal—at least one—that are purely distributive, which can be used to
achieve the bargained-for distribution of value.
The observation that the surplus-maximization conception is potentially
indeterminate is reinforced by an account why contracts are indefinite.
Negotiations—the bargaining and haggling over the terms—require time,
effort, strategy, and often fail, not because parties are under-trained in
solving maximization exercises. The failure to reach agreement and to
conclude the negotiations is not a result of some difficulty in cracking a
mathematical equation, or of the limits of the parties’ ability to foresee
and imagine contingencies. Rather, negotiations are hard precisely where
the issue is distributive, when there is no single maximizing term over
which an agreement would naturally arise. Workers go on strikes
because of disagreements on zero-sum wage terms; Nations go to wars
because of disputes over zero-sum boundary lines; and merger
agreements fail when the price offered by the buyer is regarded by the
shareholders as not high enough. The irony is that negotiations are harder
and more likely to fail when the issues are purely distributive. For these

13

UCC 2-305; FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 207-211 (4th Ed. 2004).
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issue, the “engine” of increased surplus does not provide a focal point for
agreement.
Still, even when parties fail to resolve a distributive term, they might
nevertheless choose to enter a binding contract, and leave the term open
or subject to an agreement to agree. I have explored elsewhere why they
choose this strategy.14 In a nutshell, they may do so because they expect
an agreement to be more likely be attained at a future point in time, when
walking away from the deal would become costlier. Or, they may leave
price gaps to be resolved later because they expect that some
contingency would materialize, making the distributive issue moot or
easier to resolve in reference to market indices. Or, they may expect that
upon failure to resolve the issue they will have a mechanism to arbitrate
or split the difference. In all these cases, courts may face a reality in
which the disputing parties entered a binding contract but left a crucial
distributive term out.
B. Mimic One Party’s Will
As a mechanism for gap filling, the surplus-maximization principle is
easy to justify. It improves the well being of both parties; it gives them
what they would rationally have chosen, ex-ante. If a distributive gap
cannot be filled with a surplus maximizing term, it may nevertheless be
possible to provide a similarly justified gap-filler, one that solves the
problem of what the parties would have chosen ex-ante.
In the case of distributive terms, the parties do not have a joint interest,
ex ante. To be sure, consensus over distributive issues can emerge, but it
would be a result of bargaining and maneuvering, in the shadow of
market conditions. The argument, therefore, is that the central conception
of what the joint will is—the term that maximizes the surplus from the
transaction—must be supplemented by a criterion that would apply to
settings that are purely distributive. Luckily, courts often have
information that can help them tease out what the parties would have
agreed upon: information about the relative bargaining power.
14

Omri Ben-Shahar, Agreeing to Disagree: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete
Contracts, 2004 Wisc. L. Rev. __.
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When the interests of the parties concerning a particular term are
conflicting, the term that the parties would have agreed upon depends on
the allocation of bargaining power. If one party had a significant
bargaining power advantage, he would have been able to dictate a onesided term, and thus the gap-filler should favor that party. If, instead, the
parties have equal bargaining power, the gap-filler should resemble the
split-the-difference, mid-range term. Generally, a gap-filler that depends
on any information the court has regarding the relative bargaining power
at the time of the contract is a superior proxy for the missing term. Call
this gap-filler a ‘bargain-mimicking’ default rule. Unlike standard
mimicking terms—the familiar surplus maximizers—the key feature of
bargain-mimicking terms is their sensitivity to bargaining power factors,
namely, factors that affect the division of the contractual surplus.
Thus, for example, in the context of a missing payment term, the
bargain-mimicking gap-filler would potentially favor the party that was
in a bargaining position to force the other to acquiesce and surrender to
her dictates. Unlike mid-range, split-the-difference default terms that
reflect, say, the average interest rate or the most common credit
arrangement, the bargain mimicking term could fall anywhere within a
broad interval and could be significantly different than the mid-range
solution. The greater the seller’s bargaining power, the higher the interest
rate and that would be supplied by the gap-filler. And conversely, the
greater the buyer’s bargaining power, the more lenient the credit terms.
Another example for a gap-filler that would tilt in favor of one party
comes auto manufacturing contracts. Sellers, known as “tier-1”
suppliers, compete through a bidding process to produce auto parts to be
assembled into a car model manufacturered by an automaker. Because
there are only a few automakers but many suppliers, the buyer in this
setting has much of the bargaining power, and indeed once the supplier
is selected and the price is set, the buyer dictates all the remaining terms
of the contract, including price adjustments over time.15 The standard
form contracts, however, are short and contain many gaps. For example,
15

See Omri Ben-Shahar and James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto
Manufacturing Contracts, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 953 (2006).
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they often leave unspecified the price under which “service parts” will be
sold. Service parts (which are repair parts sold to dealers and car owners
in the retail market for a substantial premium) are a significant source of
profits, but how should this surplus be divided between the automaker
and the parts supplier in the absence of specific agreement?16 Here, there
is no “market” term to refer to. A mid-range, split-the-profit price, is one
way to fill the gap. Of course, it does not reflect the true bargaining
power of the parties and does not come close to mimicking the express
deal they would have reached (the deal the buyer would have dictated,
and that some automakers do in fact dictate.) The bargain-mimicking gap
filler would supply a price that accords the greater share of the premium
to the buyer.
Notice that the content of the bargain-mimicking gap-filler is
“tailored”—it depends on factors that are specific to the parties. The
same contract, with the same gap, can be filled with a pro-seller term in
one case and a pro-buyer term in another, depending on the relative
bargaining power in each case. For example, a lease with an option to
renew under a price to be agreed upon would be supplemented with a
high, pro-landlord price if the landlord happens to enjoy greater
bargaining power (say, because of migration of many tenants into the
region). The same lease would be supplement with a low, pro-tenant
price if the tenant is the party with the greater bargaining power (say,
because of the presence of many vacant sites in the area.) Or, a regional
supplier who sells to WalMart would have its contract filled with a probuyer term, whereas the same supplier selling to a local business that has
no other sources of supply would enjoy a pro-seller gap filler.
In an interesting way, bargain-mimicking gap fillers share the same
empirical premise, and also can be contrasted with, the contra
proferentum principle. Both principles envision situations in which one
of the two parties has the bargaining power to dictate the language of the
terms and yet this party left some element ambiguous or unspecified.
That is, both principles require a determination of relative bargaining
power.17 But at the same time, the bargain-mimicking principle provides
16

See, e.g., Toyota Motors Manufacturing N.A., Inc. Term and Conditions § 4.2 (Oct.
1988) (leaving the price for service parts to be determined later).
17
Cite from insurance cases – insurer has all the bargaining power.
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the opposite prescription relative to contra proferentum. When a contract
is ambiguous or indefinite, the contra proferentum principle prescribes
the term that is least favorable (within reason) to the party who drafted
the contract. The bargain-mimicking principle does the opposite: it
supplies the term that is most favorable to the drafter, the term that
resembles the deal that the drafter was able to dictate. While the contra
proferentum doctrine relies on the notion that the strong party should by
“punished” for leaving ambiguity or indefiniteness in the contract,18 the
bargain-mimicking principle gives the strong party what she could have
gotten explicitly through bargaining. The normative case for the contra
proferentum rule is well known. Part II of the paper examines the
normative case for the bargaining mimicking approach.
C. Majoritarian versus Bargain-Mimicking Terms
The bargain-mimicking conception of gap-filling breaks a discontinuity
that is otherwise created by mid-range, majoritarian gap-fillers. If all
gaps are filled with mid-range terms, a decision by the strong party to
leave a gap in the contract as opposed to filling it with a bargained-over
express term would result in an expected forfeiture of a discrete chunk of
the private payoff. For this party, the choice to leave the contract with a
gap might well save some transactions costs, but would at the same time
cost her the opportunity to exploit her bargaining advantage and to
appropriate a clause that is more favorable to her than the mid-range
default rule. The agreement that results from mid-range gap-filling is
distinctly different from that which she would have expressly negotiated;
the more gaps she leaves, the greater the wedge between the hypothetical
agreement and the legally supplemented contract. It is this
discontinuity—the divergence between the hypothetically negotiated
deal and the legally-implied deal—that the proposed conception of gapfilling resolves. The closer the gap-fillers are to the hypothetical bargain,
the smaller the divergence.
It is clear that in many distributive contexts the bargain mimicking
criterion would prescribe terms that are generically different from the
18

See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95
Mich. L.Rev. 531, 545 (1996); Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
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majoritarian, mid-range reasonable terms. The majoritarian criterion
recognizes that different parties could have perhaps reached different
reasonable terms; namely, that there is a distribution of bargained-for
terms. It chooses a term that measures a “center” of this distribution.
Unlike the majoritarian criterion, the bargain-mimicking criterion relies
on specific information indicating the deal that these parties would have
struck, reflecting the division of bargaining power.
Still, it would be a mistake to conclude from this discussion that the
bargain-mimicking gap-fillers would always diverge from the
majoritarian, mid range, gap-fillers. The two gap-filling criteria may be
reconciled—they may prescribe the same content of gap filler—in
situations in which the bargaining positions of the parties are the
common positions that similar parties in similar situations have. These
are situations in which information about the specific parties’ bargaining
does not change the inference about the hypothetical bargain. For
example, if the parties are “price-takers”—if they are dealing in matters
for which there is a thick market and neither of them is in a unique
position within this market—it is likely that the term they would agreed
upon is the same term most parties in the market adopt. If, say,
bargaining power is determined by outside options, and if there is a thick
market of alternative partners for each party, the terms of that bargain are
influenced by the terms in that market. Here, the bargain-mimicking
principle would prescribe a term that reflects the market term—the same
term prescribed by the majoritarian criterion. But it would do so, not
because this term best reflects some statistical regularity regarding the
market, but rather because it is the best guess as to each parties’ share of
purchasing power. Put differently, majoritarian gap fillers that refer to
“reasonable market prices” can be viewed as consistent with the bargainmimicking criterion, applied to specific situations in which the
bargaining power of the parties is determined by the market.19
To illustrate, consider one of the well-known cases in which parties left
the price term open.20 This was a long-term distribution agreement
between a wholesaler and a distributor. The agreement did not fix the
19

James Gordley, Foundations of Private Law 363 (2006) (“the market price preserves
(so far as possible) each party’s share of purchasing power.”)
20
Mantell v. International Plastic harmonica Corp., 55 A.2d 250 (NJ 1947).
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price. It made reference to the prices charged to other distributors, but as
it turned out there were no other distributors. The court decided to fill the
gap with a reasonable price term, but explained that what constitutes a
reasonable price depends on the price that the seller can get from other
dealers, competition between wholesalers as well as between dealers, the
uniqueness of the product, the quantity produced, and more.21 These are
precisely the factors that determine the bargaining power of the parties.
If the seller had market power in setting a price, this market power
should be mimicked by the gap-filler.
D. Can Courts Identify the Bargain-Mimicking Terms?
There is something admittedly deceptive about the idea of bargainmimicking gap fillers. It is assumed that the division of bargaining power
between the parties is a measurable parameter that can be verified by the
court. Bargaining power is, of course, a real factor in negotiations, and
economic theory demonstrates that it depends on relative risk
preferences, outside options, discount factors, negotiation protocol, and
the like.22 It reflects, in short, the relative facility of each party to say
“no” to the deal. But it is one thing to recognize the theoretical existence
and role of this parameter; it is another thing to measure it and base legal
policy on its measurement.
It is probably naïve to expect that courts would be able to measure
bargaining power with precision. Still, implementing a regime with error,
or only in those cases where the parameter is verifiable, is better than
nothing. There are situations in which some crude approximations of
relative bargaining power are likely to be correct, even if not perfect. A
seller of a good for which demand is inelastic is known to have
bargaining power. Or, when many bidders compete for a single job, the
party inviting the bids has bargaining power. While it is hard, even in
these situations to quantify a party’s bargaining strength on a scale of 0
to 1, is it harder than adjudicating other parameters that courts ordinarily
scale, such as comparative fault in torts?

21
22

Id., at 256.
See, e.g., Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, Bargaining and Markets (1990).
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In fact, courts already (and quite regularly) refer to bargaining power as
a factor that justifies case outcomes. Under unconscionability doctrine,
the presence of one-sided bargaining power is often identified and
invoked for the purpose of reforming some explicit term.23 Under the
duress doctrine, weak bargaining power is often identified and invoked
for the purpose of relieving the weak party from a coerced deal.24 Under
the contra proferentum doctrine courts have to figure out which party
had the power to dictate a term, and rule against this party. The
Restatement recognizes that contra proferentum is “often invoked in
cases of standardized contracts and in cases where the drafting party has
the stronger bargaining position.”25 While courts at times misjudge the
relative bargaining positions (there is a misguided tendency to view a
take-it-or-leave-it offer as a sign of bargaining power26), a substantial
doctrinal tradition is nevertheless founded on the belief that courts can
identify bargaining power and fine tune the legal consequence based on
this identification.
And yet, existing doctrines that refer to bargaining power usually favor
the weaker bargainer, whereas the approach discussed here favors the
strong bargainer. This difference might be more crucial than initially
seems. For a weak party, there is no danger in arguing in court that the
other side had all the bargaining power. For a strong party, on the other
hand, arguing that she herself had all the bargaining power may be risky.
For example, if she were to argue that her bargaining power is due to a
monopoly position, she might face antitrust consequences. If she were to
argue that her bargaining power is due to information advantage, she
might face heightened disclosure requirements, or simply lose the
sympathy of the court and the jury. In other words, one’s superior
bargaining power might be a trait that one prefers to keep secret, rather

23

See, e.g., Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 845 (1991) (“there was inequality of
bargaining power which effectively robbed [promisor] of any meaningful choice.”) See
also UNIDROIT principles of International Commercial Contracts art. 3.10(1) (“lack of
bargaining skill” is a factor relevant to determination of unconscionability.)
24
Rubenstein v. Rubenstein [cite]
25
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §206 cmt a (emphasis added).
26
See, e.g., Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2002)
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than prove in court.27 A legal regime that relies on litigants
demonstrating their own superior bargaining strength faces this obstacle.
Moreover, and adding to the difficulty, even in the clear presence of
verifiable uneven bargaining power, identifying the bargain-mimicking
term may be tricky. Gaps in the contract may result from the parties’
inability to agree. Or, they may result from the strong party’s strategic
calculation to leave an issue open, recognizing that on this specific issue
the weak party would not acquiesce to a one-sided term, or would be
alerted to some hidden unfavorable aspect of the deal. If the strong party
suppressed a specific issue and left a gap deliberately, it may in fact be
an indication of the limits of her bargaining power—that in an explicit
agreement she cannot, in fact, extract the one-sided term she covets.
Here, the bargain-mimicking term is not necessarily favorable to her.
Granting her a favorable gap-filler would only encourage her to leave
gaps in areas in which she cannot bargain for an advantage. Instead of
mimicking the bargain, this regime could distort it.
Thus, the craft of filling gaps with bargain mimicking terms is more
nuanced than merely identifying the party with the greater overall
bargaining power. It requires attention the specific issue left open and the
parties’ special concerns regarding this issue. Recognizing that a bargain
usually involves some concessions even by the overall stronger party, the
court has to figure out how the parties would have used their bargaining
power over this specific term, given that some leverage—some
bargaining chips—were already spent on other, expressly drafted, terms.
Daunting as this task might appear upon first reflection, it is probably not
more complicated than other gap-filling principles. For example, under
the surplus-maximizing principle, figuring out which term is most
efficient requires a sophisticated account of costs and benefits, an
understanding how different terms and issues interact, what each party
values more, all with an eye to idiosyncratic preferences. Here, too, some
terms cannot be supplemented without careful attention to other aspects
of the deal. Still, the surplus-maximization criterion has broad appeal
27

See Omri Ben-Shahar and Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109
Yale Law Journal 1885 (2000).
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because it makes normative sense, despite the fact that it is harder to
implement than other, simpler default rules. It is the right thing to ask
courts to make the effort to figure out—it is worth the cost. In Section II
below, I will propose a normative defense of the bargain-mimicking
criterion, suggesting that here too it is a worthy effort to trace the bargain
that parties would have struck. And, at the very least, if it so happens that
courts have good information about the bargain-mimicking term, it ought
not be ignored.
II. ARE BARGAIN-MIMICKING TERMS DESIRABLE?
The purpose of this article is not to advocate for the general use of
bargain mimicking gap-fillers, but to identify it as a conceptual and
practical possibility and explore arguments in support of such a regime.
Before turning, in section III, to examine incidents of actual
implementation of this regime, let us explore some normative aspects.
A. Transactions Costs
When the gap in the contract involves an issue that affects the size of the
surplus, a well-rehearsed argument explains why the gap-filler ought to
be the surplus-maximizing provision. It is an argument of exceptional
appeal, because it side-steps any distributive implications. Surplusmaximizing gap-fillers increase the well-being of both parties to the
contract, indiscriminately. If the law were to provide off-the-shelf terms
that are anything but the surplus-maximizing arrangements, it would
have the effect of inducing the parties to write explicit provisions
instead, and other than occasional indirect benefits (say, in the form of
exposing private information), this would merely increase transactions
costs.28 And once the price or another distributive term is adjusted
appropriately to divide the saving in transactions costs—each party ends
up with a greater net payoff.
It might be perceived, though, that in the context of bargain-mimicking
terms this same distributive-neutral defense is inapplicable. If the law
28

Richard Craswell, Contract Law: General Theories, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
1, 2-4 (Bouckaert & De Geest, Eds., 2000).
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provides a gap-filler that is more favorable to one of the parties, without
affecting the size of the surplus, how can it be said that this term accords
both parties a greater surplus to divide? If it is a term that mimics one
party’s will, against the will of the other party, how could the other party
benefit from it?
Moreover, upon first reflection, bargain mimicking terms might seem to
encounter an objection that surplus-maximizing terms avoid, namely,
that they conflict with social concerns and intuitions regarding the
fairness of distribution. While surplus-maximizing terms need not have
any distributive effect—they merely secure more value to divide—
bargain-mimicking terms do not create a greater surplus and do have a
clear distributive effect in favor of the strong party. Why, it might be
asked, should it be the objective of the law to resolve ambiguities and
gaps in distributive aspects in favor of the strong party? Surely, this party
can take good care of herself and secure advantages by bargaining; If at
all, it is the weak transactor that should be protected by the law and
enjoy a distributive bias. A prescription of distributive fairness, so goes
the objection, can hardly be based on bargaining power as the conception
of merit. It should aim to undo the unfairness that unfettered bargaining
might generate, not mimic it.
Compelling as this argument might be, it is unfortunately beside the
point. The benchmark argument in favor of bargain mimicking terms is
not that these terms are fair or that they otherwise conform to an
attractive conception of distributive desert. They probably do not.
Bargain mimicking is a principle of gap-filling, not of redistribution. The
reason why bargain mimicking terms may be desirable as gap-fillers is
that, very much like surplus-maximizing terms, they save transactions
costs. If the law accords her the same terms that she can secure by
explicit (and harsh) bargaining, the party with the bargaining power need
not spend the cost of specifying the same terms in an explicit fashion. If
gap fillers tried to do anything other than mimic the term that this party
were able to dictate, they would have the ex ante effect of inducing this
party to dictate the term, to preempt any adverse allocation that would
otherwise be brought upon by the gap filler. Perhaps even more than in
other contexts, it is very likely that when the distribution is at stake the
strong party will insist on contracting around a non-mimicking gap filler.
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In the context of surplus maximizing gap-fillers, it is commonly noted
that both parties enjoy the saving of transactions costs afforded by such
terms.29 Thus, by similar logic, it must also be true that when one party
has the bargaining advantage, both parties enjoy the saving of
transactions costs achieved by bargain mimicking terms, and prefer them
over majoritarian gap-fillers. The only difference in the current context is
that the saving achieved by the mimicking terms is, like other sources of
value in the contract, enjoyed disproportionately by the party with the
greater bargaining power. Her leverage enables her to dictate a division
of the salvaged transactions cost that is favorable to her.
What, exactly, are these transactions costs that are saved by a bargainmimicking term? Beyond the obvious category of drafting costs, in the
context of unequal bargaining power there might be additional “psychic”
burdens that may be saved. There are settings in which weak parties
endure humiliation when the strong party openly dictates a one-sided
term. While this cost of punctuating one’s powerlessness owes to
emotional and behavioral (that is to say, irrational) grounds, it is
recognized as important in the negotiation literature.30 Strong parties are
advised to accord their counterparts the sense that the pie is equally
divided, even when it is not, to make it easier for them to acquiesce. A
default rule that eases the need of strong parties to openly “stick it” to the
weaker parties, has this cost-mitigating effect.
B. Drafting of One-Sided Contracts
In long term contracts, gaps result not only from transactions costs (i.e.,
the difficulty to foresee and stipulate for all future contingencies), but
also from a deliberate drafting choice to leave room for more flexibility.
Parties recognize that conditions might change and special needs or
priorities might arise, such that would render it mutually beneficial to
make future adjustments in their respective obligations. It is, of course,
possible to dictate rigid terms that apply to future contingencies and
later, if flexibility is needed, to accord waivers and accommodations
29
30

POSNER, ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF LAW 96 (6th Ed. 2003).
CITE Lax and Sibenius, The Manager as Negotiator; Mnookin et al. ….
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through course of performance. But this means that the strong party
would “waste” bargaining power to secure terms and privileges that he
would be willing to waive and that might not matter all that much, ex
post. Alternatively, recognizing the need for flexibility, the strong party
may choose to leave some issues less than fully resolved in the contract,
expecting to nail them down if and when they become relevant. A
bargain-mimicking gap-filling regime would render the open term
strategy safer for the strong party, promoting its use whenever it is the
cheaper method to draft the contract.
This technique of flexible drafting is used in various ways. At the
extreme, the contract might stipulate that a particular provision would be
agreed upon by the parties at a later stage.31 This is not an agreement to
agree; there is enough definiteness in the remainder of the contract, and
there is a clear statement of intent to be bound, to make the entire
agreement enforceable. Rather, it is an agreement with a specific
methodology for subsequent, contingent, gap filing. The gap is expressly
recognized by the parties and the methodology to resolve it is set in the
contract. When this methodology fails—when the parties do not manage
to agree at a later stage on the to-be-agreed-upon open issue, the court
has to resort to a different methodology. The bargain-mimicking
principle instructs the court, in choosing a gap filler, to lean towards the
will of the party who would had more bargaining power at the
contracting stage. To be sure, at the ex-post stage in which the term was
to be settled, bargaining power may shift and the party who originally
had more power may now be committed to the relationship and have less
leverage. Still, the parties chose the flexible drafting technique
recognizing this possible shift in bargaining power, and thus it is the
relative power at the time of that the terms was to be agreed upon that
should matter.
A common technique of flexible drafting is to allocate to one party the
power to determine, ex-post, the content of the term and to change it as
needs and circumstances change. The party with this power is not always
the strong party. For example, in output contracts the seller is entitled to
set the quantity, but it is hardly the seller who has any bargaining power.
31

Cite (GM contracts; franchising contracts)
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Thus, when a farmer sells his small crop to a large distributor/buyer, the
farmer sets the quantity ex post, but has very little bargaining strength ex
ante. In some contexts, however, the parties use this technique of onesided ex-post control over a term to create what is effectively a bargain
mimicking gap-filling regime. When a seller has the power to set the
price and vary it throughout the term of the contract, the seller is
translating his bargaining strength ex ante into a scheme that supplies
terms ex-post that are favorable to the seller. This is how oil companies
deal with their local distributors. The role of courts here is to police any
overreaching—to determine the boundaries of tolerable reach of
bargaining power (through the requirement of good faith).32 But if courts
were unwilling to allow strong parties to use this self-favorable
technique, flexible drafting of long-term contracts would be undermined.
Another technique of flexible drafting is to attach the meaning of a
particular term to some objectively observable index. For example, a
supplier in a long-term sales contract may demand that the price will
equal someone else’s posted price at the time of delivery.33 Disputes may
arise once the contractually selected index ceases to exist in the midst of
the contractual period and can no longer be referenced. Which price
should be used in its place? The strong party has, again, a sensible claim
that the supplemented price ought to mimic the bargain that would have
been struck by the parties has they expressly negotiated over a substitute
index. Or, more directly, the price ought to mimic the division of
bargaining power between the parties. If the failed index was a prosupplier price, located in the upper range of the market prices, so ought
to be the supplemented price. Any other choice would merely force
parties to choose a different pricing methodology, perhaps sacrificing
some of the flexibility.
Termination terms also illustrate the benefit of bargain-mimicking
defaults. A party enjoys strong bargaining power when there are many
potential partners whom he can choose, who bid to be chosen. Once a
bidder is chosen and awarded the contract, however, the one-on-one
relationship would no longer preserve the asymmetric bargaining power.
32
33

UCC 2-305
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Termination, however, allows the strong party to maintain the bargaining
advantage throughout the relationship, by credibly threatening to choose
another bidder. Thus, the duration gap-filler—the rule that allows parties
to terminate an open-ended contract at will34—is effectively a bargain
mimicking default rule. True, under this rule both parties have the
symmetric right to terminate. But often it is only one party—the initially
strong party who faced many bidders—who might potentially want to
terminate. The other party has too little choice to go elsewhere, or too
much sunk in the relationship, and thus if terminated will not likely find
another business. The right to terminate effectively mimics the will of
the strong party. With this safeguard in place, the strong party is freed to
use a variety of terms that he would otherwise not use. First, he is free to
use an open-ended duration. Second, he can give the other party leeway
and control over aspects of performance, not having to specify them in
the contract, knowing that if these privileges are abused there is always
the option to terminate. Finally, he can choose a bidder who is relatively
less known.
A final example where a bargain-mimicking criterion might affect the
way parties design their bargain is a prenuptial agreement. A millionaire
who is about to marry a fortuneless person often has a greater bargaining
power regarding the financial consequences of divorce. If divorce
occurs, a gap-filler that tracks this bargaining advantage would
significantly differ from a gap-filler that provides a more generous
distribution to the less affluent spouse. True, in this setting the notion of
bargaining power could be more elusive than in commercial settings.
Bargaining power is not equivalent to financial prowess; there are less
tangible factors that affect the power of a party to say “no” to the
relationship. And yet, bargaining power surely exists, it is often played
out in express prenuptial bargains, and identifying it ex-post might
relieve the parties from the costly and often damaging need to punctuate
it, ex-ante.
C. Ex Ante Investment

34

UCC 2-309
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The analysis so far assumed that the relative bargaining power of the
parties is an exogenous factor, determined before the parties enter the
negotiations. Many features may affect bargaining power—outside
options, impatience to reach a deal, reputation, financial distress,
negotiation savvy, and more—but until now it was implicitly assumed
that none of these factors depend on the gap-filling methodology. Thus,
the premise was that gap fillers can be a function of the relative
bargaining power of the parties, but not vice versa.
Theoretically, though, a bargain mimicking regime can create incentives
for the parties to make investments that affect their bargaining power. Of
course, parties already have the motive to invest in strengthening, or to
refrain from actions that weaken, their bargaining power. Such actions
help them secure better express terms in the deal. But in the shadow of
bargain-mimicking gap-fillers, the incentive to manipulate the bargaining
positions would be bolstered. Investing in stronger bargaining power
would now affect not only the explicit provisions, but also the gap fillers.
It is not clear what to make of these potential effects. Prima facie, much
of the investment in bargaining leverage is a social waste—it is a social
cost that only redistributes value without creating a corresponding social
benefit. This may suggest that the bargain-mimicking regime has the
undesirable effect of further distorting already excessive investments.
But the picture is more complex. There are other types of precontractual
investments—investments that have an effect on the total surplus of the
potential bargain, not on the relative bargaining power—that are often
set at a level that is too low, due to the hold-up problem (the anticipation
that some of the fruit of this investment will be appropriated by the other
party).35 If the party who makes the surplus-enhancing investment is also
the one who is in a position to make the bargaining-leverage investment,
it is no longer clear that the latter investment is a social waste. Investing
in greater bargaining leverage would have an indirect positive effect: it
would diminish the ability of the other party to engage in hold-up and
would thus lead to a more efficient level of surplus-creating investments.
35

See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk and Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30
Journal of Legal Studies 423 (2001).
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For example, a builder who successfully acquired an exclusive position
in a specific market can now afford, in the course of negotiating a project
with a client, to make precontractual investments in plans and materials,
knowing that his bargaining leverage would shield him from hold up.
Moreover, sometimes the same investment has both a surplus-enhancing
effect and a bargaining leverage effect. For example, learning a special
skill would make a potential employee more valuable (that is, increase
the surplus) but also accords the employee more leverage in negotiating
her wages. The incentive to make too much of this investment to enhance
the bargaining leverage is now a counterforce to the incentive to make
too little of this investment in light of the hold up problem. The bargainmimicking legal regime, which amplifies the “too much” side of this
trade off, is not necessarily bad.
In the end, though, whatever effect the bargain-mimicking gap-filling
regime has on ex-ante investment, one should doubt whether this effect
is significant. Parties have strong incentives to make investments that
increase their bargaining power even in the absence of this gap-filling
regime. Such investments secure greater payoffs through the more
favorable express terms that the investing party can draft. Ex ante, the
incremental effect of the gap-filling regime is probably negligible.
III. BARGAIN MIMICKING TERMS IN ACTION
A. General
To be sure, a general principle of bargain-mimicking gap-fillers was
never explicitly endorsed by the law. Notably, Section 204 of the
Restatement instructs courts to supply gap fillers that are “reasonable in
the circumstances,” expressly rejecting the bargain mimicking approach:
“Where there is in fact no agreement, the court should
supply a term which comports with community standards
of fairness and policy rather than analyze a hypothetical
model of the bargaining process.” (Empahasis added)36
36

Restatement (Second) of Contracts §204 cmt d.
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Despite this abstract mandate, I hope to show that in many subtle ways
contract law applies gap fillers that reflect relative bargaining power.
Before turning to judicially supplied gap-fillers, it is important to note
that principles of gap-filling can be enacted in the contracts themselves.
Bargain-mimicking gap-fillers can emerge in practice as a result of
contractual drafting that instructs courts to apply such a criterion.
Contracts often include terms that, while ambiguous and in need of
interpretation or supplementation, nevertheless point in the direction of
one-sided, bargain-mimicking arrangements. Typical boilerplate
contracts include severability or “savings” clauses that instruct courts to
enforce the contract to the maximal extent permitted by law. If a
provision that is otherwise drafted vaguely is appended by this maximal
extent boilerplate, the ambiguity is resolved in a one-sided manner. Such
drafting technique may apply to a single provision, as in warranty
disclaimer clauses,37 or it may apply to the entire contract.38 Effectively,
by including such provisions, the drafting party opts out of the “fair
community standards” gap-filling approach of Section 204 and opts into
a bargain-mimicking, one-sided gap-filling regime. The incentive to draft
such terms is particularly strong when applied to distributive issues,
where the one-sidedness does not come at the expense of the overall
surplus.
B. Examples
This section demonstrates instances in which courts explicitly recognize
the bargain-mimicking criterion of gap-filling and reach decisions in line
with it.
Termination Terms. A striking example of the application of the bargainmimicking principle came up in a case that called for interpretation of a
37

See, e.g., RealNetworks EULA (“To the maximum extent permitted by applicable
law, RealNetworks further disclaims all warranties.”)
38
See, e.g., Charles Sennewald, Security Consulting (“If the scope of any of the
provisions of the agreement is too broad in any respect whatsoever to permit
enforcement to its full extent, then such provisions shall be enforced to the maximum
extent permitted by law...”)
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termination clause in a franchise contract. When the parties have an open
ended contract duration, Section 2-309 of the Code allows each party to
terminate it at will. Even when the contract guarantees a minimum
duration, termination can occur prior to the expiration of this period if
one of the parties misbehaves. In this context, courts are often asked to
determine whether a particular event or misconduct by the franchisee
provides legitimate grounds for termination by the franchisor. In one of
the casebook favorites, The Original Great American Chocolate Chip
Cookie Co. v. River Valley,39 Judge Posner provides a striking answer.
He rejects the claim that “in a dispute between franchisee and franchisor
the judicial thumb should be on the franchisee’s pan of the balance.”
This, despite the fact that the franchisee was clearly the party with the
weaker bargaining power and should be the natural target of any
redistributive sentiment. Such a tilt, he explains, will not help franchisees
as a group: “The more difficult it is to cancel a franchise, the higher the
price that franchisors will charge for franchises. So in the end the
franchisees will pay for judicial liberality…”40 Posner continues and
invokes the logic underlying bargain-mimicking terms:
“The idea that favoring one side or the other in a class of
contract disputes can redistribute wealth is one of the most
persistent illusion of judicial power. It comes from failing to
consider the full consequences of legal decisions. Courts
deciding contract cases cannot durably shift the balance of
advantages to the weaker side of the market; the can only
make contracts more costly to that side in the future, because
franchisors will demand compensation for bearing onerous
terms.”41
39

970 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id., at __.
41
Id., at ___. In a somewhat mocking dissent, Judge Cudahy agrees that franchisees
have less bargaining power than franchisors but responds to Judge Posner’s bargainmimicking default rule by saying:
Apparently, the legislators had not read enough scholarly musings to
realize that any efforts to protect the weak against the strong would,
through the exhilarating alchemy of economic theory, increase rather
diminish the burden upon the powerless. I agree that the thumb of judges
ought not be placed on the scales of justice. But judges have no obligation
to ignore the numerous thumbs already put down on the side of economic
power…”
40
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Posner’s decision in the Original Great American Chocolate Chip
Cookie Co. case is an illustration of a bargain-mimicking term because
the contract at issue had a vague termination clause that needed
interpretation (was breach by the franchisee “material”? Did it constitute
“good cause” for termination?) The answer the court gave had nothing to
do with maximization of surplus. The court did not focus on reliance by
the franchisee and its interest to recoup its investment (as courts
sometimes do in other cases). It also did not focus on the need of a
franchisor to efficiently protect its brand and provide adequate incentives
for management of its franchised stores. Moreover, the court did not
invoke notions of hypothetical consent—terms or meanings that both
parties would have willingly chosen, if only they drafted terms with
increased resolution. Instead, the court viewed the problem as
distributive in nature, but rejected a solution that would be redistributive
in favor of the weak party. It examined the relative bargaining power and
held that the franchisor’s superior economic position would make it
futile for courts to interpret the contract in any way that does not mimic
the franchisor’s bargaining strength. Any judicial attempt to favor weak
parties for redistributive reasons would fail because of its ex ante
unintended effect on the terms drafted into the contract.
Force Majeure Terms. Another interesting illustration of the bargainmimicking principle in action came up in the context of force majeure
clauses—clauses that expand the scope of excuse otherwise available
under the doctrine of impracticability. Courts recognize that any party
can use its bargaining power to secure a favorable list of excuses by
drafting a self-interested force majeure clause. But even when the
express force majeure clause is clear, questions arise that require gap
filling and interpretation. For example, if a seller is excused against the
buyer when the seller’s source of supply defaults, must the seller assign
its remedial rights against its own defaulting supplier to the disappointed
buyer? Usually, when the grounds for excuse are in the default rule of
Section 2-615 of the Code, the answer is yes: the disappointed buyer
cannot get redress from the seller, but can step into the seller’s shoes and
recover from the interfering party. But if the grounds for excuse are not
Id., at __.
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in Section 2-615 but instead in the expressly drafted force majeure
clause, the answer appears to be no: the disappointed buyer is not
assigned any recovery rights against the defaulting supplier. Despite
being excused against the buyer, the seller can still recover from his own
defaulting supplier.
In a leading case, the 9th Circuit based this result on the bargainmimicking principle. 42 It noted that the seller used its bargaining power
to extract a force majeure clause from the buyer, and that the seller’s
supplier was unable “because of market forces” to require a similar
excuse provision. Accordingly, the seller was excused even though his
supplier was not. The court held that
“We see no reason to award the windfall of recovery against
the supplier to the buyer, who agreed to excuse the seller,
instead of the seller, who was able to insist on better
protections. […] We find no reason to transfer the benefit of
[the seller’s] superior negotiating position to [the buyer] by
giving [the buyer] rights against [the defaulting supplier].
We do find that it serves the forces of natural market
adjustment not to transfer [the seller’s] rights.”43
The decision hinged on mimicking the bargaining outcome between the
parties. True, the parties did not say anything as to whom, in the event of
excuse, would be entitled to recover from the defaulting supplier. Only
one party can get this right, and the court chose to award it to the party
with the greater bargaining power. Here, too, the decision did not hinge
on efficiency analysis, or on hypothetical joint will. The court even
speculated how the holding, with its obvious tilt in favor of the stronger
party, might affect the incentive of future parties to enter contracts with
such unfavorable terms (e.g., to move into “the more contractually
secure part of the market.”44) It nevertheless found that the gap filler in
this case, with its distributive effect, must mimic the division of
bargaining power.

42

Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd. V. Kaiser Aluminum International Corp., 719 F.2d 992 (9th
Cir. 1983).
43
Id., at 1001.
44
Id.
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Dividing a Windfall. Reading through case law on missing distributive
terms suggests that courts are clearly up to the task of ascertaining the
bargain-mimicking terms. A nice example is provided in a recent 6th
Circuit decision on how to divide a pot of money that the partied did not
expect.45 The court turned to the “community standards of fairness”
principle of Section 204 of the Restatement in holding that the party who
bears the risk is the one entitled to the unforeseen proceeds.
Interestingly, though, the court recognized that the same result would be
achieved by applying the “hypothetical model of bargaining” approach,
which the court noted to be the Restatement’s less favored mode of
analysis. It reasoned that the party who was responsible for any
downside in case the funding source defaulted or became insolvent
would have demanded that any unanticipated proceeds from this source
inure to it.46 Put differently, the court did not need to ask who has more
bargaining power in the abstract. Rather, it reasoned that with respect to
this specific term, one party would have naturally prevailed had it been
the subject of an explicit agreement.
C. Peevyhouse
The bargain-mimicking idea can help explain case outcomes in another
important area: the selective application of the cost-of-completion
measure of damages in cases of defective performance. In classic case of
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal47 the court had to decide what damages
apply when the stripmining company breached its promise to restore the
mined farm land to its original condition. The case provides a dramatic
illustration of the choice between two measures of expectation damages:
cost-of-completion, which would have been $29,000, and diminution-inmarket-value, which was only $300. It was a hard choice, and the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled 5-to-4 in favor of the diminution in
value measure. Other courts in other states held differently. Authorities
are still split.
For the purpose of our discussion here, it is interesting to note what the
trial court did in that case. Rather than granting one of the two competing
45

Bank of New York v. Janowick, 470 F.3d 264 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id., at 272.
47
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Ok. 1962).
46

- 30 -

GAP FILLING AND BARGAINING POWER

measures of recovery, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs $5000. This,
it turns out, is not merely a split-the-difference compromise; it is the
remedy that closely resembles the bargain-mimicking outcome. It is
well-documented that when the contract between the plaintiffs and
Garland Coal was signed, the plaintiffs had strong bargaining leverage.48
They were not particularly eager to enter the contract, but when they
eventually agreed, they leveraged their bargaining strength and insisted
on including a restoration clause. In fact, they waived their right to
receive an upfront restoration allowance of $3000—close to the entire
value of the farm—in order to secure that restoration clause. Thus, if
instead of a restoration clause the plaintiffs would have bargained for an
explicit liquidated allowance to be used to fund self-managed restoration,
it would have been roughly $3000—the sum they traded away for the
restoration clause. Not $29,000, nor $300. The jury award of $5000, it
turns out, comes close to mimicking that bargained-for remedy of $3000
(augmented by incidental costs arising from breach, delay, and trial).
The choice of cost-of-completion versus diminution-in-value is a
fundamental and controversial one, leading to seemingly conflicting
outcomes across cases. It is an ongoing struggle for contracts scholars to
provide a descriptive theory of the result reached by courts. Why do
some plaintiffs get the former, usually higher measure, whereas others
receive the latter, stingier recovery? Criteria such as the willfulness of
the breach and the disproportionality of the cost-of-completion are only
partial and ad-hoc organizing factors. The bargain-mimicking principle, I
argue, can bolster our understanding of case outcomes. Promisees, like
the Peevyhouses, who had the superior bargaining power to insist on a
completed performance, are entitled to the more generous measure. It
mimics the high-end liquidated damages clause they would have
bargained for. This idea, focusing on the ex-ante bargaining power of the
transactors, underlies Cardozo’s famous but cryptic distinction between
“common chattel” versus “a mansion or a skyscraper.”49 Why does
Cardozo think that courts should allow the margin of non-completion to
be greater (and the remedy to be smaller) in the case of common chattels
48

See Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and Mining Co. Revisited: the
Ballad of Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw.U.L.Rev 1341 (1995).
49
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921)
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or when the client purchased a stock floor plan house,50 but require
stricter compliance and award the higher cost-of-completion measure for
mansions? Plausibly, clients who purchase common chattel and stock
floor homes have less bargaining power against sellers and little ex ante
leverage to demand the cost-of-completion remedy. But when mansions
and skyscrapers are designed, the client is often in a strong bargaining
position. Hence, when the aggrieved party had the ex ante bargaining
power to insist of precise completion of performance that courts award
the more generous measure.51
To be sure, remedies for breach of contracts are not the kind of gapfillers that have solely distributive effects. A long and distinguished
literature has shown that, through their effect on performance and
reliance decisions, remedies have significant influence on the overall
surplus.52 Thus, there is a strong argument suggesting that gaps in the
contract concerning remedies ought to be filled with surplus maximizing
terms rather than bargain-mimicking terms. Indeed, in the context of
Peevyhouse, commentators have expressed concerns how the cost-ofcompletion measure would affect the incentive to breach-or-perform.53
And yet, despite this fundamental concern, it is quite plausible that the
damage measure chosen in cases like Peevyhouse would have only a
distributive effect. If damages are too high, inducing inefficient
performance, the parties would likely renegotiate them. And if damages
are too low, inducing inefficient breach, again the parties would have an
incentive to renegotiate.54 Thus, to the extent that the damages merely
50

Plante v. Jacobs, 103 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. 1960)
See also Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235 (Min, 1939) (awarding $60,000
cost-of-restoration when the diminution in value was no more than $12,000), and case
commentary by Robert Hillman, Principals of Contract Law 140 (2004) (arguing that
the factor that should determine the outcome is the bargaining power when restoration
clause was drafted), and Marvin A. Chirelstein, Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law
of Contracts 174 (4th Ed. 2001) (arguing that the recovery should equal the amount the
promisee could have bargained for at the agreement stage.)
52
Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 304-312 (2004).
53
Posner, Economic Analysis of law 121 (6th Ed. 2003).
54
Ian Ayres & Krisin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and
Contracts, 148 U.of Pa. L.Rev. 45 (1999) discuss the effect of the damage measure on
the subsequent rounds of bargaining over release from inefficient performance and
inefficient breach.
51
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affect the bargaining position of the parties in the renegotiation phase,
but not the performance outcome, the argument is all the more
compelling that such damages should reflect the ex ante bargaining
power of the parties, to save them the trouble of explicitly stipulating
these damages in the contract.
IV. MAXIMALLY TOLERABLE TERMS55
When bargaining power is unevenly distributed, the strong party would
naturally use its bargaining leverage to draft one-sided, self-serving
terms. But the strong party cannot overreach. The doctrines of
unconscionability and duress (as well as other rules) grant courts the
power to invalidate excessively one-sided term. Once such unreasonable
term is vacated, the court needs to fill the gap that is created and to
choose an alternative provision.
There are several systematic ways in which the gap can be filled. First,
the court can replace the excessive term with the most reasonable term.
This would likely be a mid-range, majoritarian term. Another way is to
plug in a term that is least favorable to the overreaching party, as a
penalty for overreaching and as an incentive not to overreach. Finally, a
third possible way to fill the gap is to use a bargain-mimicking term: a
term that is still one-sided, favorable to the strong party. Admittedly,
there is something paradoxical about a bargain-mimicking principle in
this context. The term that best reflects the division of bargaining power
was in fact written in the contract, and yet it was found unenforceable
under a policy aimed at limiting the reach of bargaining power. A pure
bargain-mimicking term would be equivalent to that offensive term;
surely, the court would not reinstate the same term it has just struck
down. The practical effect of the bargain-mimicking principle in this
setting is to prescribe a “maximally tolerable” term—a term that is still
one sided, still favorable to the drafting party, but just within the range
that is considered tolerable. Once the offensive term has been replaced
by a term that is within the tolerable range, even if only barely so, there
is no remaining justification for intervention.
55

This section is based on Omri Ben-Shahar, How to Repair Unconscionable
Contracts, Mimeo (2008).
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Thus, if for example the excessive term is high price, the legal
intervention would be to push this price down. If we analogize the
process of judicial intervention in the contract to a force that pulls the
price from its current intolerable level towards the permissible region,
the force gradually weakens as the price gets closer to the tolerable level,
and vanishes completely as soon as this level is hit. The point where this
adjustment process runs out of justification is not the mid-range,
majoritarian, most-balanced term. Rather, it is the maximally tolerable
price: it is still a one-sided term, albeit not as bad as the original term.
Once this term is set, the weak party has no reasonable grounds to
demand more additional redress.56
There are numerous instances in which courts apply maximally tolerable
terms. The doctrine of partial performance is one such example. Under
this doctrine, a court is authorized to reform an unreasonable term in a
contract and enforce it to extent necessary to avoid the unreasonableness.
The most common application of this technique involves non-compete
clauses that are excessive either in duration or in geographic scope. In
most states, courts repair the excessive non-compete terms by reducing
them to the maximally tolerable level.57
At times, the maximal tolerable level is defined explicitly be statutes.
Some states have enacted bright line rules stating the maximal duration
of non-compete clauses in employment contracts.58 There, only the
increment of the restraint that is socially intolerable is eliminated; the
rest stands. In other states there is no bright line statute. There, too,
courts reduce the non-compete term, bringing it down to a level that is

56

This rationale is recognized by Corbin: “The line [representing the enforceable term]
must be drawn somewhere, and it is drawn at the point where the protection to which
the buyer is justly entitled ends.” See Arthur L. Corbin, On the Doctrine of Beit v. Beit:
A Comment, 23 Conn.B.J. 40, 46 (1949).
57
See, e.g., Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L.Rev.
625, 646-651 (1960)
58
See, e.g., Section 542.335(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes (1997) (“a court… shall presume
unreasonable in time any restraint more than 2 years in duration”), enforced in
Flickenger v. Fitzgerald & Co., 732 So.2d 33 (Fl. 1999)
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maximally tolerable. The restraint “is not enforceable beyond the time or
area considered reasonable by the court.”59
Another example for the use of maximally tolerable terms relates to the
doctrine of unconscionability. Corbin noted, in the context of a loan of
money, that “a contract that requires a payment of a very high interest
will be enforced, up to the point at which ‘unconscionability’ becomes
and operative factor.”60 In the context of unconscionable arbitration
clauses, courts can replace a an arbitration mandate that includes
unreasonable terms with one that is tolerable. For example, in Brower v.
Gateway—a leading New York unconscionability decision—the court
held that a term mandating arbitration under the ICC forum is
unconscionable because of the excessive filing fee of $4000.61 It held,
though, that Gateway can cure this defect by agreeing to arbitrate in
another forum, if it entails filing fees that are not unconscionable. The
consumer still viewed this as a one sided provision, but once it was cured
to be tolerable, the court saw no grounds for further intervention.
Finally, the doctrine of liquidated damages can provide an opportunity to
use maximally tolerable terms. Courts do not enforce liquidated damage
terms that are clearly excessive and punitive, but what is the damage
term that courts supply instead? Under a bargain-mimicking approach,
the court would replace the unenforceable liquidated measure, not with
the average or most reasonable compensatory measure, but rather with
the high-end estimate of expectation damages.
There are some statements in American case law that reject this notion.62
But other legal traditions seem to directly endorse the maximally
tolerable approach. Under Israeli contract law, for example, courts are
instructed to reduce excessive damages to the level reflecting the
magnitude of loss reasonably expected at the time of contracting. In one
case in which the court reduced the liquidated damages it explicitly set
the damages above actual harm, at a level equaling “the maximal amount

59

See, e.g., Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. 1974).
1 Corbin, Contracts § 129, p. 556 (1963) (emphasis added).
61
Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y.A.D 1998).
62
For an explicit rejection of the reduce-and-enforce methodology in penalty clauses,
see Cad Cam, Inc. v. Underwood, 521 N.E.2d 498 (Oh. 1987)
60
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that the parties could have anticipated as possible harm from delay.”63 A
leading commentary states that excessive liquidated damages should be
reduced “to the highest level that the court regards as reasonably related
the harm anticipated at the time of contracting…; that is, reduced to the
measure closest to the agreed sum, such that if that measure were the
one agreed upon in the first place, the court would not have been
justified in reducing it.”64 This, in other words, is the maximally
tolerable level, the term within the reasonable range that comes closes to
mimicking the parties’ bargaining power.
CONCLUSION
When we think about courts interpreting contracts and supplying missing
terms, we do not usually regard this as a distributive task. Unless there is
clear evidence about actual but imperfectly specified intent, courts are
supposed to identify the “reasonable” term, the most efficient term, the
majoritarian term, or some other uniquely distinguished content, but
none of these criteria is defined with respect to its distributive effect.
This Article suggests that in fact the gap-filling task of the court is often
purely distributive. In many contests (as in the case of a missing price)
there are many potential provisions courts can choose from, all satisfying
the reasonable or efficient criteria, but differ in their distributive
allocation. Thus, contract law needs to provide a criterion for choosing
the gap-filler in these distributive contests.
It is one thing to argue that we are faced with a recurring contractual gap
that needs a systematic solution, for which existing gap-filling principles
surprisingly do not apply. It is another thing to propose a bargainmimicking solution—one that favors the strong party. Some readers
might object to this proposed criterion as morally unjust. If there is a
distributive aspect to gap filling, why not turn it into a redistributive
63

Zaken v. Ziva, Civil Appeal No. 539/92 (Unpublished), p. 4.
U. Yadin, CONTRACT LAW (REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT ) 1970, p. 132 (2d
Ed. 1979) (in Hebrew). See also Eyal Zamir et. al, BRIEF COMMENTARY ON LAW
RELATING TO PRIVATE LAW 302 (1996) (in Hebrew) (“the measure of reduction of
liquidated damages ought to be to the level for which the element of excessiveness no
longer applies…[such that] if that level was set in the first place, it would not have been
reduced by the court.”)
64
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occasion in favor of the weak party? The answer I provide in this Article
is that we don’t really have a redistributive occasion and that gap fillers
cannot effectively favor the weak party. Those who have greater
bargaining power can always use this power to dictate explicit terms,
rather than leave room for “more balanced” gap-fillers. The more
redistributive gap filler are, the less likely it is that they will come into
play. Gap fillers that go against this allocation of power and try to upset
it will only induce the strong parties to exert express, self-favorable,
terms. Perhaps there is something the law can do to level the playing
field, but it is surely not a gap-filling regime. If we are serious about
helping weak parties secure better deals, we probably need to get our
hands dirty and engage in more aggressive forms of market regulation,
mandatory quality rules, and redistribution. Using redistributive gapfillers might give the ad-hoc impression that contract law is sensitive to
the plight of weak parties, but would effectively do very little to have
any systematic effect. Thus, along the well established view that the
most that gap-filling rules can accomplish is simpler contract formation
rituals, I concluded that purely distributive gap-fillers must adhere to a
bargain-mimicking criterion and tilt in favor of the stronger party.
It is true that identifying the division of bargaining power can be difficult
and error-prone. In the Article I suggested that this problem might not be
as severe as it initially appears, but conceded that it does poses a
significant challenge. Still, no matter how daunting this judicial task
might be, it cannot justify a different gap-filling criterion. To be sure,
there might be easier-to-apply criteria that are straightforward and
require very little case-specific information. The problem is that if
parties expect courts to supply gap-fillers other than the bargainmimicking ones, they will be forced to draft terms with less gaps and
with less flexibility. In this sense, the bargain-mimicking criterion is
inevitable.
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